Sybil-Proof Mechanisms

I discuss a fundamental impossibility result on proposer selection mechanisms: If different actors can generate different value from block proposal (or sequencing) rights, the only sybil-proof and incentive compatible way of assigning proposal rights is through an (arguably centralizing) auction. In other words, any proposer selection mechanism can at most satisfy two out of three fundamental requirements: incentive compatibility, sybil-resistance and decentralization.

This is MEV

MEV has largely been a field where engineering drives science, it’s now time for science to drive engineering: we present an axiomatic formalization of MEV, the theory based on it, and the new applications that it enables.

Comparing Slashing Penalties on Proof-of-Stake Networks

With the support of the Ethereum Foundation, we have performed an analysis of slashing penalties on the seventy largest proof-of-stake cryptocurrency networks. Using insights from institutional economics and game theory, we consider variance in slashing penalties in terms of the conditions that trigger slashing, the magnitude of penalties contemplated, and the limited cases where human judgment plays a role in determining such penalties.

A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0

Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"

A DAG-Based Mechanism for Fairer and More Decentralized Reward Distribution

Ethereum rewards validators for their correct and timely votes, incentivizing honest behavior and ensuring security. Although Ethereum has advanced large-scale decentralization, its current mechanism for verifying timely attestations is not entirely decentralized. This presentation highlights a bottleneck in Ethereum's reward distribution that could compromise LMD GHOST security. We propose a distributed DAG-based reward mechanism to enhance security, fairness, and incentive compatibility.

Demand-based recurring fees in practice

ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.

Agent-based modeling of Execution Tickets

Execution Tickets are currently debated as one of the most promising approaches to streamline incentives at protocol level. We created a holistic overview of potential mechanism designs and implementing an agent-based model to realistically compare different mechanism designs and identify potential drawbacks early on. The agent-based modeling approach is presented together with the results. In the second part, we will guide through running the simulation in the workshop.

Oracles for number values

We will overview the history and state of research on how to design a cryptoeconomic oracle that outputs a number value. One wants such tools for price oracles, but also for bringing other information on-chain, e.g. the damages to award from an on-chain insurance contract. We will look at approaches ranging from Vitalik's 2014 SchellingCoin proposal to ideas drawing from social choice theory, including based on recent research. We will explore tradeoffs including resistance to several attacks.

Superliquid Mechanisms for Decentralized Stablecoins

USDC and USDT outpace decentralized stablecoins in large part due to their liquidity. This talk covers the theory, data, and risks of stablecoin liquidity innovations. This will include mint/redemption mechanism design, liquidity pool design, rehypothecation, and protocol-owned liquidity. The analysis will distill how the flexibility of decentralized stablecoin issuance mechanisms can safely be used to their advantage over centralized stablecoins, which Gyroscope v2 is putting into practice.

Is multi-block MEV a thing? Insights from 2 years of MEV Boost Data

Multi-block MEV describes MEV that arises from one party controlling several consecutive slots. Currently, it is discussed as a potential blocker for several prominent mechanism designs. We analyzed two years of MEV boost data covering more than 5 million slots to investigate historical patterns of it. Amongst other findings we see less multi-slot sequences occur than randomly feasible however that payments for longer sequences are higher than average.