Superliquid Mechanisms for Decentralized Stablecoins

USDC and USDT outpace decentralized stablecoins in large part due to their liquidity. This talk covers the theory, data, and risks of stablecoin liquidity innovations. This will include mint/redemption mechanism design, liquidity pool design, rehypothecation, and protocol-owned liquidity. The analysis will distill how the flexibility of decentralized stablecoin issuance mechanisms can safely be used to their advantage over centralized stablecoins, which Gyroscope v2 is putting into practice.

Demand-based recurring fees in practice

ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.

Beyond Multidimensional Fee Markets

We study TFMs in the presence of heterogenous transactions and computational nodes. Our first set of results show that multidim fee markets (such as EIP-4844) fail to achieve good guarantees as heterogeneity increases. We complement this result by introducing the Broker Mechanism, which works in the fully heterogenous setting. This mechanism is suitable as a market for sharding computation, delegating computation to off-chain nodes (prover markets and coprocessors), and allocating preconfs.

Nano-payments on Ethereum

Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain

A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0

Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"

Voting with time commitment

Token-based voting mechanisms employed by DAOs can encounter three potential problems: plutocracy, Sybil attacks and vote buying. If one were to design a voting mechanism from scratch, how does one ensure that these issues are addressed adequately down the road? This talk aims to provide some intuition for the trade-offs faced when tackling these problems in general, and the role of time commitment in alleviating these issues, in particular.

Exploring Auction Mechanisms in Protocol Design

Auction mechanisms are fascinating, and so are protocol designs. When you put both together, things get really interesting. In this talk, we'll dive into various auction mechanisms and see how they shape protocol design choices. We'll cover key aspects like the timing game, MEV burn, and participant trusts. Then we will look at case studies: Ethereum, Optimism, and Arbitrum. For each case, we'll conclude how protocol impacts auction or vice versa.

How much security does your restaking protocol really need?

Restaking protocols have aggregated millions of ETH with the hope of securing new infrastructure on Ethereum. These services, such as ZK provers and oracles, require restaking ETH to enforce custom slashing rules. But how much ETH do these services need? And how much risk do these services place on Ethereum L1? We will formulate a mathematical model for answering these questions and present an empirical analysis of cascading risks from restaking services to Ethereum, with a positive outlook!

Does Ethereum Really Need PBS? Solving MEV at the app vs the infrastructure layer

In this talk, we will give a brief history of MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) and its influence on enshrining PBS (Proposer Builder Separation) into Ethereum. We will explore the Ethereum community’s evolving perspectives on PBS while looking at successful outcomes, unexpected consequences, and alternate solutions. Ultimately, the talk will provocatively ask: does Ethereum really need PBS at all?

Fair combinatorial auction for trade intents: how to design mechanisms without a numeraire

When designing mechanisms on the blockchain, there may be no single asset that can be used to reallocate the benefits of participating in the mechanism among its participants. Hence, the designer cannot separately address achieving an objective and sharing the resulting gains, as the objective affects how/whether these gains can be shared. This raises fairness concerns. We discuss the relevance of this issue for trade intent auctions and propose a novel mechanism: the fair combinatorial auction.